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    Abstract  
 
We investigate the pattern of intergenerational transmission of 
language in a bilingual society. We consider the case of 
Catalonia, where the two main speech communities, Spanish and 
Catalan, are of similar sizes, both languages are official, and each 
one enjoys the protection of a different layer of government. 
However, whereas all native Catalan speakers are bilingual, only 
a fraction of native Spanish speakers are fully proficient in 
Catalan. In this environment, transmission decisions are far from 
trivial. We provide a simple theory showing that changing the 
costs of acquiring a second language affects language skills as 
well as the language parents speak to their children. Empirically, 
we exploit the natural experiment generated by a language-in-
education reform that introduced Catalan–Spanish bilingualism at 
school to estimate the causal effects of language skills on 
intergenerational transmission. Results show that the increased 
proficiency in Catalan among native Spanish speakers induced by 
the reform augmented their propensity to speak Catalan to their 
offspring. The causal effect of the policyinduced increase in 
language proficiency on language transmission is not confounded 
by spurious trends, potential changes in language identity, and 
linguistically mixed partnership formation. 
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Language skills impinge on many social and economic outcomes. In particular, it has 
been extensively documented that immigrants proficient in the host-country language 
enjoy enhanced employability and substantial wage premia. Bleakely and Chin (2004) 
and Chiswick and Miller (2007) are just two prominent examples of a fairly large and 
geographically diverse literature.1 Thus, promoting additional language skills alleviates 
wage inequality and is likely to raise efficiency owing to the positive externality generated 
by the acquisition of a second language (Selten and Pool, 1991; Church and King, 1993). 
A few studies have also examined the transmission of language skills between first- 
and second-generation immigrants. More specifically, Bleakley and Chin (2008) and 
Casey and Dustmann (2008) for the cases of the US and the UK, respectively, found that 
the parents’ English-speaking proficiency yields significant, positive results for children’s 
English proficiency. These findings imply that the family background influences the 
individual’s language repertoire; that is, parents’ decisions are not fully offset by other 
sources of skills, such as the school. Therefore, language-related inequalities are likely to 
persist across generations.2 
This evidence also raises some important questions. First, through what mechanism 
are language skills inherited? The children’s language skills may be affected by the 
language spoken within the family. Alternatively, the parents’ proficiency in the host-
country language may have an impact on residential and school choices. Whereas the 
former is an intimate decision, the latter could be affected by various policy instruments. 
Second, what are the parents’ motivations behind their language choices? On the one 
                                                          
1 In a similar vein, starting with Frankel and Rose (2002), it has been shown that the knowledge of foreign 
languages significantly influences the pattern of international trade (see also Mélitz, 2008, and Egger and 
Lassmann, 2015). 
2 More recently, Kuziemko (2014) demonstrated the existence of reversed intergenerational transmission, 
with the proficiency of immigrant parents being negatively affected by their children’s proficiency. That 
is, parents lean on, rather than learn from, their children. 
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hand, they may be inclined to transmit the language that embodies their cultural heritage 
or their ethnic identity. On the other hand, they may consider passing on the host-country 
language to foster their children’s integration, shelter them from discrimination, and 
ultimately improve their economic outcomes in the long-run.3 Third, what are the 
determinants of the intergenerational transmission of language in bilingual societies? 
Previous studies have focused on immigrants in societies with a predominant language. 
Clearly, parents also face non-trivial language choices in environments in which there is 
more than one language that cannot be considered a “minority” language. There, the key 
issues are not so much related to the speed of assimilation, but to the economic value of 
bilingualism, the level of endogamy of different speech communities, and the long-run 
contest between competing languages for dominance. Understanding the pattern of 
language transmission in bilingual societies involves a whole new set of issues. 
In this paper, we address some of these questions. We study the pattern of 
intergenerational transmission of language in an asymmetric bilingual society. In such an 
environment, the behavior of the speakers of the stronger language is as relevant as the 
behavior of the speakers of the weaker language. We pay special attention to the role of 
language policies and their long-lasting effects on language-related inequality. 
We focus on the Spanish region of Catalonia. Catalonia is a particularly interesting 
case study for two reasons. First, it is a pure example of an asymmetric bilingual society 
(with two large speech communities) in which communication is not at stake owing to 
the universal knowledge of one of the languages. In particular, Spanish and Catalan are 
both official languages in Catalonia and have coexisted for ages. Moreover, they have 
similar numbers of native speakers. However, they do not hold symmetrical positions. 
                                                          
3 Related to this point, Algan et al. (2013) shown that the economic incentives affects the transmission of 
cultural identity, captured by naming patterns. Specifically, they found that the employment penalty 
associated with Arabic names in France reduces the probability of assigning an Arabic name to the new-
borns.   
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Spanish is a very strong global language, with more than 400 million native speakers. In 
contrast, Catalan is only spoken in the territories of the former Crown of Aragón, and less 
than six million people use it on a daily basis. Thus, the differential incentives to learn 
Spanish and Catalan are huge. As a result, all native Catalan speakers are fully bilingual 
(high proficiency in both Catalan and Spanish), whereas only a fraction of native Spanish 
speakers are proficient in Catalan. Second, in the 1980s the regional authorities 
implemented a durable language-in-education reform that introduced Catalan as a 
medium of instruction (together with Spanish) in Catalan schools, which significantly 
enhanced the Catalan proficiency among native Spanish speakers.4 
The universal knowledge of Spanish implies that any real effects generated by any 
new language skills induced by the policy reform must be associated with the role of 
languages beyond communication. Furthermore, the large-scale reform, which was 
unexpected and gradually implemented, represented a “natural experiment”. In particular, 
we are able to exploit the heterogeneous effect of compulsory exposure to the reform by 
native language to identify the causal effects of skills on the language spoken with their 
children. 
For the case of Catalonia, and despite the fact that the ability to communicate has 
never been at stake, there is ample empirical evidence on the value of bilingualism. In 
particular, it has been shown that knowledge of Catalan fosters employability (Rendon, 
2007) and increases earnings (Di Paolo and Raymond, 2012; Cappellari and Di Paolo, 
2018). It also affects social outcomes; in particular, it increases the frequency of mixed 
marriages (Caminal and Di Paolo, 2017).5 
                                                          
4 This reform was a crucial step in the process of promoting the knowledge and use of Catalan after Franco’s 
regime, when the public use of the language was banned. 
5 There is a growing literature in economics showing that languages are much more than neutral 
communication devices. A number of studies have shown that linguistic diversity (taken as a proxy of 




Thus, the fact that bilingualism is rewarded by the market and, moreover, improves 
the quality of other social interactions is likely to affect parents’ decisions regarding 
language transmission. Indeed, whereas virtually all native Catalan speakers use Catalan 
with their children, the behavior of native Spanish speakers shows great variability, with 
approximately a third speaking Catalan with their children. 
We first present a simple choice-theoretic model of the intergenerational 
transmission of language in a bilingual society, which provides testable predictions and 
helps frame the data analysis. The model portrays the optimal choice of the language(s) 
parents use with their children as balancing their own language preferences with the 
welfare of their children. Individuals are assumed to have a preferred language, but they 
are willing to (at least, partially) switch to their second language, provided that a more 
mixed linguistic repertoire has a sufficiently positive effect on the welfare of their 
children. Parents with better proficiency in their second-language experience a lower cost 
of switching. Consequently, the main prediction of the model (and the main testable 
implication) is that an exogenous increase in the proficiency in the second language is 
expected to increase the intensity with which such a language is transmitted to the next 
generation. Thus, policies that change current language skills are also expected to have 
longer-term effects. 
We next exploit language-in-education policy changes to estimate the causal effect 
of parental language skills on the choice of language spoken with children for the case of 
Catalonia. We can access unique survey information on the linguistic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents, their language background, as well as the language 
spoken with their children. 
                                                          
instance, Alesina et al. (2003) and Desmet et al. (2013). More recently, different characteristics of 
languages have been associated with different economic behaviors regarding various intertemporal 
decisions, as well as female labor participation (Chen, 2013; Gay et al., 2013; Galor et al., 2016). 
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The language-in-education reform of 1983 followed on from the approval of the 
Language Normalization Act (LNA) and induced a sharp change in the educational 
system: starting from that academic year, students in any grade of primary and 
compulsory secondary school were taught using both Catalan and Spanish. Therefore, 
individuals that were at school in 1983 or who started school after that year were partially 
or completely exposed to the bilingual regime, whereas older individuals were entirely 
educated in the monolingual regime (in Spanish). The sociolinguistic characteristics of 
the Catalan population in the early 1980s were crucially affected by the massive 
immigration flows from the rest of Spain that took place in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Since the population of Catalan origin was already proficient in oral Catalan, bilingualism 
at school boosted Catalan skills among the population of Spanish origin. We leverage 
year of birth and native language to construct an instrumental variable (IV) for the Catalan 
skills of native Spanish speakers, which exploits potential exposure to bilingualism at 
school during compulsory education.6 The validity of the instrument relies on the 
assumption that direct cohort effects in language transmission in addition to the ones 
operating via language fluency are common between Catalan and Spanish speakers, 
which we provide corroborating evidence for. 
We show that parents’ language skills matter in the intergenerational transmission 
of language. The reform had a significant impact on proficiency in Catalan for Spanish 
natives, increasing it by on average around one point on a 10-point scale (15% increase) 
for those who were exposed to bilingualism for the whole of their compulsory education, 
relative to the benchmark of no exposure. Using the proposed IV, we find that a unit 
increase in proficiency increases the intensity of intergenerational Catalan use for Spanish 
native speakers by 40% of a point on the 1–5 scale, corresponding to an 18% reduction 
                                                          
6 Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) used the exposure to the language-in-education reform as an exogenous 
determinant of national identity in Catalonia. 
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in the average gap in Catalan use between native Spanish and native Catalan speakers, 
which is in line with the main prediction of the theoretical model. 
Our results are consistent with the idea that policies that reduce the cost of acquiring 
a second language can significantly change language skills with spill-overs onto the next 
generation. In the last part of the paper we provide several robustness checks to 
corroborate the validity of our results. The evidence from falsification exercises indicates 
that our exclusion restriction is not capturing spurious trends across the cohorts. The 
results are also stable when we adopt alternative definitions of native languages. 
The theoretical model emphasizes the role of the parents’ language skills in 
intergenerational language transmission. However, it also considers possible alternative 
mechanisms that could potentially explain the empirical evidence. First, the educational 
reform might have changed not only skills but also the preference for the language to be 
transmitted to the children. To address the likelihood of this alternative channel, we 
exploit information on the respondents’ self-identification language. We argue that if 
changes in preferences are a relevant channel, then results should be affected by the 
exclusion of “language switchers” (i.e. individuals whose self-identification language is 
different from their mother tongue). We show that they are not, which suggests that the 
potential changes in language preferences induced by the reform are not the main driver 
of the more intense use of Catalan by native Spanish speakers with their children. 
Second, it could also be the case that enhanced language skills induced by the 
reform did not have a direct effect on language transmission, but rather the effect was 
through partnership formation. That is, native Spanish speakers with better Catalan 
proficiency are more likely to marry a native Catalan speaker (Caminal and Di Paolo, 
2017). Hence, the more intense use of Catalan with the children could be owing to the 
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differential behavior of mixed couples. However, when we exclude linguistically mixed 
couples, the results also remain unaffected. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we provide a brief 
historical account of the sociolinguistic dynamics of Catalonia. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical model. Section 4 contains a description of the data used in the empirical 
analysis. The empirical framework is detailed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main 
results and Section 7 examines the evidence from the robustness checks. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Historical background 
Catalan and Spanish (Castilian) are both Romance languages. Catalan is the variety of 
Vulgar Latin that developed in the territory from the 9th century. Spanish arrived in 
Catalonia as early as the 15th century and consolidated its position among the elite in the 
18th century. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the expansion of elementary education 
increased the knowledge of Spanish among the general population. 
Franco’s regime (1939–1977) represented a serious setback for Catalan. It imposed 
Spanish as the only official language and the only language to be used in education. 
Catalan was excluded from most social activities but, nevertheless, it was still intensively 
used in the private sphere and, more importantly, transmitted across generations. The 
massive migration flows from the south of Spain to Catalonia in the 1960s and early 
1970s dramatically changed the demographics of the region. In the mid-1970s, 40% of 
the Catalan population was born outside Catalonia. Urban segregation of immigrants and 
the ban on the use of Catalan in schools and media meant that, for the first time in history, 
a very large fraction of the Catalan population was monolingual in Spanish (Woolard and 
Gahng, 1990; Siguan, 1991). 
9 
 
The political environment drastically changed with the advent of democracy. In 
particular, new language-in-education policies were introduced after the approval of the 
Language Normalization Act (LNA) in 1983. The primary goal of the LNA was for all 
students to be fully bilingual in both Catalan and Spanish by the end of their compulsory 
education. It also established an education system in which students were not separated 
on the basis of their native language. With the implementation of this reform, education 
slowly evolved from a system in which Catalan was excluded to one in which Catalan 
was the main language of instruction in compulsory education.7 The reform led to a 
significant improvement of the Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers, whereas the 
Spanish skills of both native Spanish and Catalan speakers remained essentially 
unchanged (at excellent levels).8 
Nowadays, the position of the two languages in Catalan society is still asymmetric, 
but the situation is clearly more complex. Spanish is the dominant language in Spain, the 
official language throughout all its territory, and backed by the central government. 
Moreover, it is one of the most important global languages with almost 400 million native 
speakers and probably more than 200 million second-language speakers. Clearly, the 
private and social incentives to learn Spanish are huge. Catalan enjoys strong support 
from the regional government. Besides Catalonia, it is also spoken in other territories of 
the ancient Kingdom of Aragón, mainly Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Overall, less 
than six million people speak Catalan on a daily basis. Consumption of media and cultural 
goods in Catalonia is largely in Spanish, with the exception of radio and books where the 
share of Catalan fluctuates around 50% and 30%, respectively. Local and regional politics 
                                                          
7
 See Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013), or Cappellari and Di Paolo (2018), for more details about the 
LNA reform. 
8 See Section 4 for some descriptive figures about language proficiency by native language. 
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are conducted mostly in Catalan, but in other branches of government (such as judicature) 
Catalan is almost non-existent. 
Three facts deserve special consideration. First, all Catalan citizens are fully 
proficient in Spanish, but not all are proficient in Catalan. This asymmetry is not likely 
to die out any time soon. Even though basic skills in Catalan are widespread among the 
younger generations, the distribution of Catalan skills still exhibits high variance. Thus, 
in terms of proficiency, Spanish is still the dominant language, but less so than a few 
decades ago. Second, the labor market seems to consistently reward bilingual individuals, 
as reported by Rendon (2007), Di Paolo and Raymond (2012), and Cappellari and Di 
Paolo (2018). Third, bilingualism also provides non-monetary private and social rewards. 
In particular, increased fluency in Catalan among native Spanish speakers has increased 
their chances of finding a partner from the other language community (Caminal and Di 
Paolo, 2017). 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 The benchmark model 
In this section, we lay out a simple choice-theoretic model of language transmission in an 
asymmetric bilingual society. The model aims at capturing some of the crucial trade-offs 
involved in such a decision with no claim of generality. On the contrary, since the goal is 
to provide a plausible interpretation of the empirical results, we will make special 
assumptions that aim at representing the specific case of Catalonia as closely as possible. 
The main focus is on the language(s) that parents use with their children. Such parental 
choice will be an important (but not the only) determinant of the children’s future 
linguistic repertoire, which in turn will influence their wellbeing. 
11 
 
We analyze a society with two languages, A and B. The initial number of native 
speakers of each language is similar.9 However, the status of these two languages is not 
symmetric. Language A is a strong global language and hence the incentives to learn it 
are huge. In contrast, the incentives to learn language B are only linked to its domestic 
use, and hence are much more limited. 
The model considers two stages and two generations, old and young, of the same 
size. In the first stage, each member of the old generation (the parent) is matched to a 
member of the young generation (the child), forming a family. Parents differ in their 
linguistic background (skills and preferences). Each parent chooses the language(s) used 
in the family, which determines the child’s linguistic background at the beginning of the 
second stage. During the second stage, the members of the young generation can make 
costly investments that further improve their proficiency in these languages. 
We describe parents’ linguistic choices as well as children’s posterior decisions as 
concerning continuous variables. This facilitates the analysis as well as the connection 
between the model and the data. Parents are assumed to have rational expectations about 
their children’s choices. Thus, we use backwards induction and first examine the second 
stage. The family linguistic heritage (native language(s)) of a member of the young 
generation is represented by a pair , , where  ∈ 	0,1 is the intensity of the use of 
language  within the family,  = , , and the resource constraint is  +  = 1. Thus,  = 1 denotes an individual whose unique native language is . The family is not the 
unique source of language skills. The influence of other factors (including the school) are 
modelled as the individual’s optimal choice, balancing costs and benefits. We let  ∈	0,1 be the individual’s proficiency in language , with which they arrive to adulthood 
                                                          
9 Hence the labels that are typically used to reflect the relative size of their speech communities, “majority” 
or “minority”, cannot be applied here. 
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(and to the labor market). Individuals can improve their proficiency in language  by an 
amount  −  ≥ 0 by incurring a cost ( − ), where () is an increasing and strictly 
convex function. The benefits of proficiency  are denoted by (), which is an 
increasing and strictly concave function.10 Notice that, for simplicity, the benefits of 
acquiring a language only depend on the level of proficiency in that particular language 
and not on the proficiency in the other language or on the distribution of language skills 
in the society. In particular, even in the case that everyone is fully proficient in language 
A and hence communication is not at stake, we assume that learning language B still 
provides additional benefits. The asymmetry between these two languages will be 
captured by a single parameter, . In particular, for a fixed value of proficiency, z, we let 
 =  ≡ ,  > 1. Thus, learning language A generates higher benefits. 
For simplicity, we assume that cost functions are identical:  −  =  −  ≡
 − . 11 
Given , , an individual is expected to choose her proficiency in both 
languages ,  in order to maximize the difference between benefits and costs. Hence, 
in the case of an interior solution, the optimal choice, ∗, will be given by ∗ =
∗ − . Two technical remarks are in order. First, notice that ∗  ∈ 0,1. Hence, ∗ −  decreases with . Second, if 1 ≥ ′1, then for all , the optimal 
level of proficiency in language A is ∗ = 1. That is, individuals of all backgrounds will 
end up being fully proficient in language A. We will maintain this assumption throughout 
this section, and hence ∗ = 1.12 In contrast, ∗  will typically be an increasing 
                                                          
10 Throughout the analysis we also assume that this function, as well as the rest of the functions introduced 
below, are twice continuously differentiable. 
11 It could make sense to assume that learning language A is cheaper, because of its more frequent use in 
the media and in non-domestic interactions. Introducing this additional asymmetry would reinforce our 
results. 
12 This assumption is not necessary for the main comparative static result discussed below. 
13 
 
function of . More specifically, we assume that 0 − 0 > 0 so that ∗  >0. 
It will be useful to summarize the implications of different inherited linguistic 
capacities for the welfare of a member of the young generation. Since  +  = 1, then 
such a family background can be represented by a single variable, . In particular, we 
let # be the indirect utility function of a member of the young generation with 
background : 
 
# = 1 −  + $∗ % − ∗  −    (1) 
 
Note that # = −+ ′∗ −  and # < 0. Moreover, #0 >0. Consequently, the value of  that maximizes #, ̅, is always strictly positive and 
lower than one.13 Hence, the most profitable linguistic background includes a positive 
skill in language B, the relatively weaker language. The reasons are twofold. First, 
bilingualism is positively rewarded in society, even though everyone is fully proficient in 
language A. Second, the learning cost function is convex, which means that a mixed 
linguistic background minimizes total costs. 
We next turn to the first stage and examine the linguistic decisions of the members 
of the old generation. The asymmetry between the two languages is also reflected in the 
distribution of parents’ linguistic skills, which we take as exogenous. All parents are fully 
proficient in their native language, but only native B speakers are fully proficient in 
language A, whereas not all native A speakers are proficient in language B. In particular, 
we denote by parameter ( ∈ 	0,1 the level of proficiency in language B of a native A 
                                                          
13 If the costs of learning language A are lower, then ̅ is higher, and it can even be equal to 1. In addition, ̅ decreases with , but ̅ > 0 even if  = 1. 
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speaker: ( = 1 indicates that the parent is fully bilingual and ( = 0 is purely 
monolingual. In the case of native B speakers, the level of proficiency in the second 
language is ( = 1. 
Parents also have heterogeneous preferences about the language they use, in 
particular with their children. The intensity of these preferences is denoted by a parameter 
) ∈ 	1,2. For now, suppose that individuals have a preference towards their native 
language (to be relaxed). In particular, the higher the value of ), the stronger the 
preference for using their native language with their children. Moreover, since the 
minimum value of ) is equal to 1, then the net cost of switching to the second language 
is proportional to ) − (, which is always positive. 
A native A speaker with parameters ), ( chooses the fraction of time,  ∈ 	0,1, 
that she uses language B with her child in order to maximize her objective function: 
 
 + = −) − (, + #      (2) 
 
where ,.  is strictly increasing and convex. The first term represents the disutility of 
using her second language (B). Notice that a higher value of  is associated with lower 
utility. Moreover, for a given value of , both a higher value of ) and a lower value of ( imply lower utility. Since they are both entered linearly in the objective function, 
preferences and language skills are modelled as perfect substitutes. The second term 
represents the economic reward of their children’s (endogenous) linguistic repertoire. If 
the solution is interior, then it is given by the following first order condition: 
 




That is, the optimal value of , ∗ , balances the parent’s disutility from using the 
second language and the children’s payoff derived from the family linguistic background 
(preferences versus economic incentives.) Notice that the cost of switching decreases with 
language skills. That is, using the implicit function theorem, we derive the main 
comparative static result: 
 -∗. > 0, which is the main hypothesis tested in this paper: 
 
Prediction: An exogenous increase in the proficiency in language B among native A 
speakers induces a more intensive use of language B with their children. 
 
For completeness, we now consider the choice of a parent who is a native B speaker. 
In this case, her utility function can be written as: 
 
 ) − 1,′1 −  + #′ = 0      (4) 
 
Unsurprisingly, ceteris paribus, native B speakers uses language B more often than 
native A speakers. In fact, ∗ = 1 provided ) − 1,′0 + #′1 ≥ 0. 
Our formulation of the parent’s objective function is related to two different strands 
of the literature on intergenerational transmission. First, the language choice influences 
the position of the children in the labor market, which is reminiscent of the literature on 
the intergenerational transmission of inequality (see, for instance, Solon, 2014). The main 
difference is that in this literature parents pay for the physical resources (time and money) 
required to build the children’s stock of human capital, whereas in our case the costs are 
exclusively associated with linguistic preferences. Second, the language choice is also 
determined by parental preferences and, in this sense, is related to the literature on the 
intergenerational transmission of cultural traits (see, for instance, Bisin and Verdier, 
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2001). However, our simple model focuses on the transmission of language skills and 
ignores transmission of values or linguistic preferences. 
Both the assumptions and predictions of the model fit the Catalan case reasonably 
well. In particular: if we identify language A with Spanish and language B with Catalan, 
then (i) the probability of being bilingual (high proficiency in both languages) is higher 
for native Catalan speakers, (ii) bilingualism is rewarded in the labor market, despite the 
fact that everyone is proficient in Spanish, and (iii) native Spanish speakers transmit 
Catalan to their children, although less intensively than native Catalan speakers 
(descriptive statistics corroborating these statements are provided in Section 4). 
This model cannot adequately represent societies with an undisputed dominant 
language (for instance, English in the US). In those cases, a bilingual immigrant worker, 
who has learnt the dominant language in addition to her native language, could be worse 
off than a monolingual, native speaker of the dominant language as far as their labor 
market position is concerned (Chiswick and Miller, 2017). The potential premium 
associated to the knowledge of the immigrant’s native language is very small, and 
probably dominated by the possibility of being discriminated against on the basis of a 
peculiar accent. Thus, exclusively transmitting the dominant language to the next 
generation (language shift) is often an optimal strategy. In a more balanced bilingual 
society, discrimination on the basis of accents is much less likely (since it will be so 
pervasive) and in contrast the economic value of bilingualism is likely to be higher. 
 
3.2. Alternative mechanisms 
a) The role of mixed couples 
Suppose now that the language used with the children is cooperatively chosen by two 
parents; that is, two different individuals with potentially different language skills and 
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preferences.14 If they are both native A speakers, then the value of  that maximizes the 
sum of the utilities of both parents is clearly an intermediate value of their individual 
optimal choices. In the case of a mixed couple (each member has a different native 
language) the solution is also intermediate, but since the optimal value of  for a native 
B speaker will tend to be higher, then a native A speaker in a mixed couple is expected 
to choose language B more intensively than in a homogeneous couple owing to a stronger 
averaging effect. 
If parental decisions are taken by two heterogeneous individuals then it could make 
sense to model language transmission as a two-variable choice: the fraction of time each 
parent uses language B with their children (which can be chosen cooperatively or non-
cooperatively). It is still natural to assume significant spill-overs: each parent cares about 
both variables, but presumably with different intensities. It is straightforward to see that 
this alternative formulation opens the door to a substitutability effect: The native A 
speaker in a mixed couple has incentives to use language B less intensively than the 
partner in an attempt to minimize the total costs associated with the use of a second 
language. If such a substitutability effect dominates the above averaging effect then a 
native A speaker would be expected to use language B less intensively in a mixed couple. 
Of course, which effect dominates is an empirical matter. 
 
b) Preference switching 
In the previous discussion, we suggested that preferences could be determined by the 
individual’s native language. Although the native language is likely to be a fundamental 
determinant of linguistic preferences, individuals are exposed to other influences that may 
                                                          
14 Thus, a family is formed by two members of the old generation and an undetermined number of members 




also affect their preferences.15 The benchmark model also provides an immediate 
comparative static result that could be relevant in the interpretation of the empirical 
results: if native A speakers reduce their relative preference for using language A with 
their children (lower value of )) or, more drastically, replace language A by language B 
as their preferred language, then they will use language B more intensively with their 
children. Hence, if the same exogenous (policy) change that alters language skills can 
also affect language preferences, then we would need to pay attention to the relative 
strength of each of these channels. 
 
4. Data description 
The data are drawn from the Survey of Language Use of the Catalan Population, which 
is produced by the Catalan Statistical Institute (IDESCAT), is representative of the 
Catalan population, and is available for survey years 2008 and 2013. The survey contains 
unique information on sociolinguistic characteristics, such as native language (first 
language spoken at home during childhood), self-identification language, proficiency in 
both Catalan and Spanish, parental native language, (current or former) partner’s 
language and, most importantly, the language normally spoken with the first three 
children. It also provides detailed sociodemographic characteristics (gender, year of birth, 
place of birth, place of residence, education, etc.) and parental background (father’s and 
mother’s place of birth, language, and the level of education attained). All variables are 
self-reported by the respondent. 
We focus on individuals who were entirely educated in Catalonia and exclude from 
the estimation sample those born in other Spanish regions who migrated to Catalonia at 
age 6 or older. Foreigners are also excluded from the estimation sample. The first birth-
                                                          
15 Moreover, some individuals have more than one native language, in which case the explanatory value of 
the native language would be ambiguous. 
19 
 
cohort that experienced some exposure to bilingualism in compulsory education contains 
those born in 1970, who attended the last grade of compulsory school in 1983. We build 
our sample symmetrically around this pivotal cohort and include in the analysis 
individuals born from 1950 up to 1990, implying that the youngest respondent is aged 18 
and the oldest 63 at the date of interview.16 
Virtually all selected respondents report that either Spanish or Catalan is their native 
language or the language they speak with children, and we deleted the few (120) 
observations for which this is not the case. Roughly 60% of respondents who meet the 
previous criteria have at least one child and can contribute to the analysis. After applying 
all the data selections described above and eliminating some observations with missing 
values in the relevant variables, we obtain a sample of 3,667 observations (out of about 
14,000 cases available in the two waves of the survey). 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Native language (of the individuals, their parents, and eventually their partner) is 
originally classified into three categories (not considering other languages): 1) only 
Catalan, 2) Catalan and Spanish, and 3) only Spanish. There are very few cases of mixed 
native language (4.2%). We consider individuals to be native Spanish speakers if they 
declare their native language to be only Spanish (the results are robust for this choice, as 
we show later). According to this definition, 45% of individuals are native Spanish 
speakers. Although the survey reports separate information on several dimensions of 
proficiency (understanding, speaking, writing, and reading), here we focus on oral 
proficiency in Catalan, since oral fluency is the most relevant domain of language 
proficiency for language transmission from parents to children. Self-reported speaking 
skills in Catalan are coded on a 0–10 scale, with higher levels referring to more advanced 
                                                          
16 We use data for older cohorts to conduct placebo exercises, see Section 6. 
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language skills. Native Catalan speakers are virtually fully proficient in their language 
(77% report a value of 10), whereas the average oral skills in Catalan are 1.9 points lower 
for their native Spanish speaker counterparts (the difference is statistically significant). 
Although we have separate information on the language spoken with each of the 
first three children, we only consider the first child, both to preserve sample size 
(respondents with at least two children are 64% of the selected sample) and because there 
is little between-children variation in language spoken with children by birth order. The 
language spoken with children is recorded into five categories, namely: only Spanish (1), 
more Spanish than Catalan (2), equal Spanish and Catalan (3), more Catalan than Spanish 
(4), and only Catalan (5). The large majority of native Catalan speakers transmit their 
native language to the firstborn child. Conversely, a substantial amount of variation is 
observed among native Spanish speakers. Only 39% of them speak only Spanish to their 
firstborn child, whereas 25% speak only Catalan, and the remainder mixes both 
languages. 
 
5. Empirical framework 
We now set out an empirical framework to test the main prediction of the theoretical 
model of Section 3 by estimating the effect of parental linguistic skills on the choice of 
language parents speak with their children. As we know from the previous sections, native 
Catalan speakers are fully proficient in Catalan and almost exclusively use Catalan with 
their children. On the other hand, native Spanish speakers are not in general fully 
proficient and exhibit more variability in their choice of language transmission. We have 
information on native language (a dummy variable / that equals 1 if individual i reports 
Spanish as the native language), the language spoken with the firstborn child (an ordinal 
variable 0 taking values from 1 to 5 on a monotonic scale of intensity of use of Catalan), 
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and the self-assessed degree of oral proficiency in Catalan (a variable  that takes values 
from 0 to 10 for increasing levels of proficiency). 
Assuming that the native language is exogenous, the equation of interest is as 
follows: 
 
0 = 1 + 23 + 4 + 56 + 7 , / = 1     (5) 
 
where 8 is person i’s year of birth and 5 is a year of birth fixed effect to control for 
secular trends, the vector 3 contains individual’s age polynomial, child’s age 
polynomial, gender dummy, and a wave dummy. In this model, the parameter 
4 represents the effect of Catalan linguistic skills on native Spanish parents’ decision on 
how intensively to use Catalan with their children. This is the key parameter measuring 
the impact of skills on the intergenerational transmission of language: the prediction to 
be tested is 4 > 0. 
Our theoretical framework clearly highlights the direction of causality between 
parental skills and intergenerational transmission. However, a causal interpretation of the 
OLS estimate of equation (1) requires orthogonality between the linguistic skills () and 
unobservables that may affect the choice of the language spoken, summarized in the error 
term 7. This is clearly hard to claim. For instance, Spanish natives with a taste for Catalan 
culture will invest in their own linguistic skills and will also be more likely to use Catalan 
with their children. As long as preferences are unobservable, the simple OLS estimate of 
(5) will deliver biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.17 
                                                          
17 Moreover, the self-reported nature of the language fluency variable could be another source of bias if 
individuals tends to over-report their language skills. This potential measurement error is likely to bias the 
estimates obtained by OLS downward. 
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We address these concerns by exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in 
linguistic skills induced by the LNA reform of 1983. As documented by Caminal and Di 
Paolo (2017) and Cappellari and Di Paolo (2018), cohorts educated in both Catalan and 
Spanish are more proficient in Catalan than older cohorts educated in Spanish only, and 
this effect crucially depends on language background, since native Catalan speakers were 
already highly proficient in both languages even before the implementation of the reform. 
However, using reform-induced variation across birth cohorts of native Spanish speakers 
only will not be sufficient to generate a valid IV because that variation would be 
confounded with secular trends in the language spoken with children. A solution is to also 
include native Catalan speakers in the analysis and to assume that any secular trend in 
intergenerational language use is common between the two groups. This framework can 
be exploited in a difference-in-differences (DiD) setup to generate an instrumental 
variable for Catalan proficiency, where the compliers are Spanish native speakers in 
“treated” cohorts. 
This approach is in the spirit of the identification strategy proposed by Bleakley and 
Chin (2004, 2008, and 2010). They estimate the assimilation effects of English 
proficiency among US immigrants, exploiting the well-established fact of the existence 
of a “critical period” of language acquisition (i.e., immigrants who arrive in the host 
country at a very young age assimilate the language more easily). Their identifying 
variable is the interaction between age at arrival and a dummy that takes the value one if 
the immigrant comes from a non-English-speaking country. Under the assumption that 
the non-language assimilation effects of early migration are the same for immigrants 
arriving from English-speaking countries as for those from non-English-speaking 
countries, the differential effect of age at arrival for those who migrated from a non-
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English-speaking country should be purged of non-language-related effects and thus 
would represent a valid exclusion restriction. 
In our case, we exploit the fact that oral language skills are also acquired within the 
family at an early age. Hence, the language-in-education reform did not exert any 
significant effect on the oral proficiency of native speakers. Moreover, the Spanish skills 
of native Catalan speakers remained very high and stable over cohorts. The underlying 
assumption of our identification strategy is that both language communities were subject 
to the same general cohort effects in intergenerational language use. Therefore, specific 
cohort effects experienced by native Spanish speakers after the policy change should be 
attributed to their improved skills in Catalan. Under this assumption, the IV estimator 
identifies the causal effect of oral proficiency in Catalan on language transmission among 
native Spanish speakers affected by the LNA reform (a Local Average Treatment Effect, 
LATE). 
After including Catalan native speakers in the analysis, equation (1) becomes: 
 
0 = 1 + 23 + 4 + 9/ + 56 + 7,    (6) 
 
which is estimated on the full sample and where we have added a control for native 
language. Because there is essentially no variation in Catalan skills for Catalans, the 
associated parameter (4) estimated from equation (2) is virtually equivalent to its 
counterpart in equation (1), and also equivalent to that that would be estimated by entering 
the / interaction in equation (2) in place of , as in each case the source of variation 
used in estimation is the same. 
To construct the IV, one option is to separate cohorts on the basis of the year of 
birth, individuals born after 1970 representing the treated cohorts. However, not all 
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treated cohorts received the same amount of bilingual education during their compulsory 
schooling, and a binary pre-post indicator would miss this key aspect of the analysis. One 
reason for differential exposure is the sharp implementation of the reform across all 
educational levels in 1983, implying that for cohorts already attending school in that 
academic year the actual amount of exposure depends on the remaining number of years 
before completion of compulsory education. Secondly, a subsequent reform that took 
place in 1990 extended compulsory education from 8 to 10 years, translating into longer 
exposure to bilingual schooling for cohorts born in 1983 and onwards. Therefore, to 
capture differential treatment intensity within the group of treated cohorts, we construct 
the exposure indicator as a stepwise function of the birth year: 
 
:6 = ;10 , 8 ≥ 19838 , 1977 ≤ 8 < 19838 − 1969 , 1970 ≤ 8 < 19770 , 8 < 1970  .   (7) 
 
This is exactly the variable that Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) used to measure 
the degree of exposure to the educational reform during compulsory education, and that 
they used as an exogenous determinant of political identity in Catalonia. In our case, using 
the exposure indicator, the first stage DiD equation for instrumenting skills in Catalan is: 
 
 = ( + B′3 + C/ + D:6/ + E6 + F    (8) 
 
where E6 is a year of birth fixed effect. Replacing the prediction from the first stage 
equation (G), the IV estimator for the effect of skills on intergenerational language use 




0 = 1 + 23 + 9/ + 4HG + 56 + 7      (9) 
 
As discussed earlier on in the section, the consistency of 4H is based on the 
assumption that non-language cohort effects that could be captured by the exposure 
variable are common between Spanish and Catalan speakers, and are thus partialled out 
by the (common) year of birth fixed effects included in the main equation (56). Since 
4H parameterises a causal relationship, we can now re-frame the test of the theoretical 
model prediction as 4H > 0. 
 
6. Results 
In Table 2 we report the OLS estimates of the impact of linguistic skills on language 
transmission choices for native Spanish speakers, corresponding to parameter 4 in 
equation (1).18 The positive parameter estimate indicates that linguistic skills in Catalan 
are associated with more intense use of Catalan with children. In particular, in column (1) 
a unit change in the linguistic skill indicator (, measured on a 0–10 scale) is associated 
with a 0.281 increase in the intensity of Catalan use with children (0, measured on a 1–
5 scale). The estimated effect is highly significant. It indicates that one standard deviation 
increase in oral proficiency in Catalan is associated with an increase of 0.46 standard 
deviation points in the intensity of the use of Catalan with the first child. Alternatively, 
considering that the average of the Catalan use indicator is 4.8 for native Catalans and 2.6 
for native Spanish speakers, the result indicates that a unit increase in linguistic skills 
reduces the mean difference in Catalan use in the two groups by 13%. Adding controls 
                                                          
18 Complete results are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Results are unaffected if we use models for 
ordered data in place of OLS. 
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for parents’ and individual’s characteristics in columns (2) to (4) does not affect the 
substance of the evidence. 
As discussed in Section 5, the causal parameter of interest in equation (1) is not 
identified as long as unobserved determinants of linguistic skills also affect the choice of 
language spoken with children. We can address this issue by means of the proposed IV 
estimator, which exploits the differential change in linguistic skills between native 
Spanish and Catalan speakers induced by the 1983 reform. We therefore begin by 
including also the information on native Catalan speakers in the analysis and estimate 
equation (2) by OLS using the full sample. Results are presented in Table 3 and show that 
the point estimate of the impact of linguistic skills is virtually the same as the one 
estimated in the sample with only native Spanish speakers (see Table 2A in the Appendix 
for the complete results). This is because there is almost no variation in linguistic skills 
among native Catalans, and hence the underlying parameter estimates in Tables 2 and 3 
are essentially the same. 
Using the full sample, we can now move to the IV estimates. The upper panel in 
Table 4 reports the first stage DiD estimates of the impact of bilingual compulsory 
education on skills in Catalan.19 The positive estimate of D indicates that for native 
Spanish speakers 1 year of exposure to bilingual education increases reported oral 
proficiency by 0.114 points on the 0–10 scale. The predicted proficiency score among 
Spanish native speakers educated before the reform is 7.45, implying that someone 
starting school after the reform (and therefore experiencing 10 years of exposure to 
bilingual school) experiences a proportional increase in proficiency of approximately 
15% relative to the benchmark of no exposure (= 10 × 0.114/7.45). The effect is relevant 
and also statistically significant; in particular, the F-statistic for the instrument shows that 
                                                          




it is a rather strong predictor of proficiency. Reading across columns, we note that the 
first stage estimate is rather stable after introducing additional controls, which speaks in 
favor of the exogeneity of the proposed IV. 
The lower panel of Table 4 reports the IV estimates for the effect of linguistic skills 
on intergenerational language use. Under the assumption that cohort effects in language 
transmission, other than the ones operating through skills, are common across speech 
communities, the IV estimates capture the causal effect of the increase in oral skills in 
Catalan of native Spanish speakers (induced by the LNA reform) on the language spoken 
to the first child. The estimated effect is larger than in the OLS counterpart: for example, 
in column (1) a unit increase in proficiency increases the intensity of intergenerational 
Catalan use for native Spanish speakers by 40% of a point on the 1–5 scale, corresponding 
to an 18% reduction in the average gap of Catalan use between native Spanish and Catalan 
speakers (= 0.404/2.2). In the likely case of absence of defiers to the reform, the IV 
estimate can be interpreted as a LATE, the causal effect of skills for the sub-group of 
compliers, native Spanish speakers whose proficiency increased because of the reform. 
The fact that the IV estimate is larger than the OLS counterpart suggests that the 
intergenerational transmission decision may be more reactive to increases in linguistic 
skills for compliers compared with the general population.20 
 
7. Robustness 
7.1 Validity of the instrument 
We now subject our findings to a number of robustness checks. We begin in Table 5 by 
addressing the sensitivity of our results to different functional form specifications of the 
                                                          
20 However, the finding of a higher impact of language proficiency on language transmission estimated by 
IV might be also due to the presence of measurement error in the language skills variable, which tends to 
bias OLS downward (under classical measurement error). 
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DiD first stage regression. Specifically, rather than a linear specification (as in the 
baseline specification, reported in column (1)), we run our IV using either a quadratic 
function of exposure (column (2)) or dummies for each year of exposure (column (3)). 
The point estimate of the parameter of interest obtained under alternative functional forms 
is virtually the same as in the more parsimonious specification based on linear effects in 
the first stage.21 
Second, we address the concern that the DiD first stage regression is not capturing 
a genuine effect of bilingual schooling on skills, but rather a generalized trend in linguistic 
skills affecting younger cohorts of native Spanish speakers, a circumstance that would 
invalidate the causal interpretation of the IV estimates. To gain insights into this potential 
issue, we proceed by estimating the reduced form effect of the language-in-education 
reform on intergenerational transmission and compare it with analogous estimates 
obtained from placebo reforms. To mimic placebo reforms, we construct a sample of 
cohorts that never actually received bilingual education, and pretend that some of them 
were exposed to bilingualism at school. More specifically, we exclude from our original 
estimating sample cohorts of individuals treated by the reform (those born from 1970 to 
1990) and include older cohorts of non-treated (1949–1945, stopping in 1945 owing to 
limitations in the availability of information of year of birth).22 Next, for the resulting 
sample of non-treated individuals born in 1945–1969, we assume that the reform was 
implemented in a placebo year, and re-estimate the reduced form effect for this placebo 
reform. We conduct the exercise for placebo years 1963 through to 1970. The results 
presented in Table 6 show that the reduced form effect of the interaction between 
compulsory exposure and the dummy for being a native Spanish speaker is positive and 
                                                          
21 We also checked that the results are stable to different specifications of the functional form of the effect 
of individual and child’s age, as shown in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. 
22 See Table A7 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics referring to the placebo sample. 
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statistically significant, as expected, with 1 year of exposure to bilingual education raising 
the probability of transmitting Catalan to children by 4.6 percentage points (p.p.) in the 
group of native Spanish speakers. Instead, the coefficients of placebo exposure interacted 
with the dummy for being a native Spanish speaker are generally insignificant and 
negative, which goes against the idea that our exposure variable is capturing spurious 
positive trends across cohorts. Thus, the evidence suggests that our first stage regression 
is plausibly capturing the effect of the policy change, supporting our interpretation of the 
findings from the IV model. 
Having obtained reassuring evidence with respect to the main component of our 
exclusion restriction (the compulsory exposure variable), we scrutinize its second 
component, the native language variable. This variable is self-reported and we are 
concerned about the possibility that the misreporting error could be endogenously driven 
by the reform. The reason is that some treated native Spanish speakers could define 
themselves as a native Catalan speaker just because they were exposed to Catalan at 
school. Therefore, we repeat our estimations using alternative proxies for native language, 
namely the language of the parents (a dummy that takes the value 1 if both parents have 
Spanish as their native language) and the origins of the parents (a dummy that takes the 
value 1 if both parents were born outside Catalonia). The results are reported in Table 7 
and show that the point estimate when we use these two alternative proxies for native 
language (especially regional origins) is somewhat higher than the baseline, but the 
overall results remain unchanged.23 Moreover, in the last column of the same table we 
also show the results obtained after dropping observations with mixed native language, 
i.e. individuals who claim their native language is Spanish and Catalan. Again, the main 
                                                          
23 This is possibly because the new subpopulations of compliers resulting from these alternative variables 
to define language background are more sensitive to the reform than those captured by the original variable 
for native language (as confirmed by the higher coefficient of the instrument in the first stage). 
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coefficients are undistinguishable from the baseline, which again points to the overall 
robustness of our results. 
 
7.2 Alternative mechanisms 
Both our theoretical model and our empirical results emphasize the importance of 
language skills in changing the incentives to transmit the native language to the children. 
However, there may be alternative mechanisms that are consistent with our empirical 
findings. 
The first potential mechanism is that the reform may have also changed the 
language preferences of the compliers. Language preferences are likely to be closely 
related (although not perfectly correlated) to ethnic or national identity. Thus, the 
evidence reported in Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013), indicating that the 1983 reform 
promoted the Catalan identity, provides a motivation to explore such an alternative 
mechanism. In particular, our findings could be driven by a change in language 
preferences. Our theoretical setup clearly indicated that a lower relative preference for 
using the native language (lower value of )), or a switch in the preferred language, had 
the same qualitative effects as an improvement in proficiency in the second language. 
That is, native Spanish speakers who increased their skills in Catalan owing to the 
exposure to the reform, may have also reduced their preferences towards the use of 
Spanish with their children. Fortunately, the survey does contain a question about the 
respondents’ language of self-identification, which is coded in the same way as the native 
language. We believe that those respondents with a language of self-identification that is 
different from their native language are the ones that might have experienced a change in 
preferences. We provide some suggestive evidence about the role of changes in language 
preferences induced by the reform by re-estimating the model without “language 
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switchers” (individuals whose self-identification language is different from their mother 
tongue.) The results, reported in the second column of Table 8, are very stable with 
respect to the baseline in column 1, indicating that changes in language preferences are 
not the main driver of the results. 
The second alternative mechanism we consider is endogenous partnership 
formation. Indeed, one of the extensions of our benchmark theoretical model suggests 
that transmission choices may depend on the language characteristics of the partner 
(mixed versus homogeneous couples). Empirically, the potential relevance of such an 
alternative mechanism is confirmed by Caminal and Di Paolo (2017), who found that the 
increase in proficiency in Catalan among native Spanish speakers induced by the reform 
raised their propensity to find a Catalan-speaking partner and to more intensively use 
Catalan with the partner. Therefore, it is possible that the effects we found are simply 
reflecting that those native Spanish speakers who become proficient in Catalan after its 
introduction as a medium of instruction more intensively use this language with their 
children simply because they are more likely to be in a linguistically mixed couple. To 
appreciate the relevance of this alternative mechanism as a plausible interpretation of our 
empirical results, in the third column of Table 8 we repeat the analysis excluding mixed 
couples (i.e. individuals whose partner has a different mother tongue). This exclusion 
does not alter the substance of our findings, providing suggestive evidence that changing 
assortative patterns induced by the reform are not the main driver of the estimated effects. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that policies that change second-language skills may alter the pattern of 
intergenerational transmission of language. We have proposed a simple theoretical model 
of an asymmetric bilingual society, in which parents choose the language they use with 
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their children by trading off their language preferences with the economic incentives of 
their offspring (bilingualism is rewarded in the labor market). As parents improve their 
proficiency in the second language, the costs of switching to their second language fall 
and, as a result, they are more inclined to (also) transmit their second language to their 
children. Empirically, we exploit a natural experiment generated by a policy change 
implemented in Catalonia in the 1980s. Our results indicate that increased proficiency in 
Catalan among native Spanish speakers induced by the policy change raised their 
propensity to transmit Catalan to their children. We also discuss alternative and plausible 
interpretations of our results. In particular, the change in the pattern of intergenerational 
transmission could also be generated by a change in language preferences or by a higher 
propensity to form mixed couples. We provide suggestive evidence that these two 
alternative mechanisms are not the main drivers of our results. 
Better second-language skills improve the chances that the second language is 
transmitted to the next generation (intergenerational spillover effects of second-language 
acquisition). Thus, language-related inequalities may persist across generations. We knew 
that such a channel operates among immigrants in countries with a well-defined dominant 
language. This paper shows that this channel can also function in bilingual societies, as 
long as transmitting the second language is also associated with monetary or non-
monetary rewards. It also highlights that language policies that affect the skills of the 
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Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
language spoken with first child: only Catalan 0.610 0.488 0.912 0.283 0.246 0.431
language spoken with first child: more Catalan than Spanish 0.047 0.213 0.028 0.166 0.070 0.256
language spoken with first child: equal Catalan and Spanish 0.088 0.283 0.036 0.187 0.149 0.356
language spoken with first child: more Spanish than Catalan 0.070 0.255 0.010 0.099 0.143 0.350
language spoken with first child: only Spanish 0.185 0.388 0.013 0.113 0.392 0.488
age of the first child 16.747 10.413 17.454 10.500 15.895 10.245
oral skills in Catalan 8.714 2.154 9.578 0.911 7.672 2.692
oral skills in Spanish 9.558 0.943 9.415 1.094 9.729 0.683
native Spanish speaker 0.454 0.498 0.000 1.000
Catalan (or Catalan and Spanish) as self-identification language 0.696 0.460 0.982 0.131 0.349 0.477
partner Catalan (or Catalan and Spanish) native speaker 0.580 0.494 0.769 0.422 0.351 0.477
both parents Spanish speakers 0.408 0.491 0.033 0.178 0.859 0.348
both parents born outside Catalonia 0.356 0.479 0.043 0.203 0.732 0.443
years of compulsory language exposure 1.660 2.852 1.446 2.702 1.918 3.003
wave 2013 0.554 0.497 0.546 0.498 0.563 0.496
age 45.563 8.495 46.591 8.528 44.325 8.290
















Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
father's place of birth: Barcelona 0.207 0.405 0.274 0.446 0.126 0.332
father's place of birth: Girona 0.071 0.257 0.126 0.332 0.005 0.073
father's place of birth: Tarragona 0.036 0.186 0.062 0.241 0.005 0.069
father's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.059 0.235 0.100 0.300 0.009 0.095
father's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.071 0.257 0.119 0.324 0.014 0.117
father's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.058 0.234 0.098 0.297 0.010 0.101
father's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.034 0.182 0.060 0.238 0.003 0.055
father's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.010 0.099 0.009 0.094 0.011 0.104
father's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.015 0.122 0.006 0.077 0.026 0.159
father's place of birth: other Spanish regions 0.422 0.494 0.130 0.337 0.773 0.419
father's place of birth: other places 0.011 0.104 0.009 0.094 0.013 0.114
miss father's place of birth 0.006 0.079 0.007 0.083 0.005 0.073
mother's place of birth: Barcelona 0.217 0.412 0.287 0.453 0.132 0.338
mother's place of birth: Girona 0.072 0.259 0.124 0.329 0.010 0.098
mother's place of birth: Tarragona 0.042 0.201 0.071 0.257 0.007 0.085
mother's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.059 0.236 0.104 0.305 0.006 0.077
mother's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.065 0.247 0.110 0.313 0.011 0.104
mother's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.059 0.236 0.099 0.299 0.011 0.104
mother's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.032 0.175 0.054 0.227 0.004 0.065
mother's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.019 0.137 0.019 0.138 0.019 0.135
mother's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.017 0.128 0.008 0.089 0.027 0.162
mother's place of birth: other Spanish regions 0.406 0.491 0.108 0.311 0.765 0.424
mother's place of birth: other places 0.007 0.082 0.008 0.089 0.005 0.073
miss mother's place of birth 0.005 0.070 0.006 0.077 0.004 0.060
(highest) parental education: no education 0.220 0.414 0.144 0.351 0.311 0.463
(highest) parental education: primary 0.524 0.499 0.555 0.497 0.487 0.500
(highest) parental education: secondary 0.168 0.374 0.204 0.403 0.125 0.331
(highest) parental education: tertiary 0.064 0.244 0.074 0.262 0.051 0.219
missing parental education 0.024 0.153 0.022 0.148 0.026 0.159
individual's place of birth: Barcelona 0.485 0.500 0.385 0.487 0.606 0.489
individual's place of birth: Girona 0.089 0.285 0.126 0.332 0.045 0.208
individual's place of birth: Tarragona 0.058 0.234 0.063 0.243 0.053 0.224
individual's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.066 0.248 0.114 0.318 0.008 0.088
individual's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.096 0.295 0.129 0.335 0.057 0.232
individual's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.085 0.278 0.110 0.313 0.054 0.225
individual's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.043 0.203 0.067 0.250 0.014 0.119
individual's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.004 0.059 0.001 0.039 0.006 0.077
individual's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.005 0.073
individual's place of birth: other Spanish regions 0.071 0.258 0.004 0.067 0.152 0.359
individual's place of residence: Barcelona city 0.128 0.335 0.101 0.301 0.162 0.368
individual's place of residence: Barcelona's metropolitan area 0.317 0.466 0.204 0.403 0.454 0.498
individual's place of residence: Girona 0.113 0.317 0.146 0.353 0.073 0.260
individual's place of residence: Tarragona 0.077 0.267 0.080 0.272 0.074 0.262
individual's place of residence: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.073 0.260 0.120 0.325 0.017 0.129
individual's place of residence: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.132 0.339 0.143 0.350 0.119 0.324
individual's place of residence: Central Catalonia 0.093 0.291 0.112 0.316 0.070 0.256
individual's place of residence: Pyrenees 0.065 0.247 0.093 0.291 0.031 0.174
completed education: primary or no education 0.293 0.455 0.250 0.433 0.345 0.476
completed education: secondary 0.455 0.498 0.447 0.497 0.464 0.499
completed education: tertiary 0.238 0.426 0.289 0.454 0.175 0.380
completed education: other education levels 0.014 0.119 0.013 0.115 0.016 0.124











Table 2: OLS regressions (outcome = language spoken with the first child), only 





Table 3: OLS regressions (outcome = language spoken with the first child), pooled 















(1) (2) (3) (4)
oral skills in Catalan 0.281*** 0.278*** 0.244*** 0.242***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)   
parents' controls NO YES NO YES
individual controls NO NO YES YES
adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.260 0.293 0.295   
number of observations 1663 1663 1663 1663   
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials for individual's
and child's age and individual's year of birth dummies. Regression in column (2) contains controls for paternal
and maternal place of birth (with missing indicators) and highest parental education (with missing indicators).
Regression in column (3) includes controls for individual’s place of birth, place of residence and completed
education. Complete results are reported in Tables A1 in the Appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
native Spanish speaker -1.647*** -1.413*** -1.468*** -1.334***
(0.047) (0.069) (0.049) (0.068)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.233***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)   
parents' controls NO YES NO YES
individual controls NO NO YES YES
adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.572 0.584 0.587   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667 3667   
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials for
individual's and child's age and individual's year of birth dummies. Regression in column (2) contains
controls for paternal and maternal place of birth (with missing indicators) and highest parental education
(with missing indicators). Regression in column (3) includes controls for individual’s place of birth,


























(1) (2) (3) (4)
FIRST STAGE — outcome: oral skills in Catalan
native Spanish speaker -2.102*** -1.735*** -1.613*** -1.473***
(0.104) (0.117) (0.103) (0.116)   
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.110***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)   
adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.235 0.281 0.284   
F-test of excluded instruments 21.78 21.41 20.40 19.70
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
2SLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.379*** -1.244*** -1.270*** -1.179***
(0.243) (0.186) (0.186) (0.175)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.404*** 0.369*** 0.376*** 0.355***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.119) (0.121)   
parents' controls NO YES NO YES
individual controls NO NO YES YES
adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.555 0.559 0.568   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667 3667
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender,
cubic polynomials for individual's and child's age and individual's year of birth dummies.
Regression in column (2) contains controls for paternal and maternal place of birth (with missing
indicators) and highest parental education (with missing indicators). Regression in column (3)
includes controls for individual’s place of birth, place of residence and completed education. The
F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the
interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator for
Spanish as native language. Complete results of the first-stage regressions are reported in Table










FIRST STAGE — outcome: oral skills in Catalan 
native Spanish speaker -2.102*** -2.130*** -2.143***
(0.104) (0.108) (0.111)   
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.114*** 0.232***             
(0.025) (0.085)             
exposure
2
 × native Spanish speaker -0.016             
(0.011)             
exposure = 0 × native Spanish speaker
exposure = 1 × native Spanish speaker 0.591***
(0.111)   
exposure =2 × native Spanish speaker -0.083   
(0.114)   
exposure = 3 × native Spanish speaker 1.027***
(0.115)   
exposure = 4 × native Spanish speaker 0.662***
(0.110)   
exposure = 5 × native Spanish speaker 0.709***
(0.118)   
exposure = 6 × native Spanish speaker 1.009***
(0.118)   
exposure = 7 × native Spanish speaker 0.963***
(0.116)   
exposure = 8 × native Spanish speaker 0.676** 
(0.249)   
exposure = 10 × native Spanish speaker 1.356***
(0.449)   
adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.223 0.223   
F-test of excluded instruments 21.78 13.33 25.60
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
2SLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.379*** -1.297*** -1.382***
(0.243) (0.233) (0.209)   
oral proficiency in Catalan 0.404*** 0.447*** 0.403***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.103)   
adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.520 0.540   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667   
ref. cat.
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions
include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials for individual's and
child's age and individual's year of birth dummies. The F-test on excluded
instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions
between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator
for Spanish as native language. 
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Table 6: falsification analysis (Baseline and Placebo Reduced Form Equations) 
 
1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
native Spanish speaker -2.228*** -2.298*** -2.287*** -2.266*** -2.243*** -2.218*** -2.187*** -2.168*** -2.152***
(0.052) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.103) (0.112)   
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.046***             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker 0.010             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker 0.007             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker 0.002             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker -0.003             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker -0.007             
(0.014)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker -0.013             
(0.015)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker -0.015             
(0.015)             
exposure* × native Spanish speaker -0.017   
(0.017)   
adjusted R-squared 0.472 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500   
number of observations 3667 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037   
placebo reform in:real reform 
in 1983
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions
include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials for individual's and child's age and individual's year of birth dummies. The regression in the
first column is reduced form equation for the baseline sample. Regressions in columns 2-9 are based on a subsample of never-treated individuals (born
between 1945 and 1969, in Catalonia or migrated before age 6); placebo compulsory exposure (exposure*) is imputed “as if” the reform was implemented





















(1) (2) (3)   (4)
OLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.647*** -1.428*** -1.194*** -1.694***
(0.047) (0.043) (0.053)   (0.049)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.264*** 0.302*** 0.335*** 0.265***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)   (0.009)   
adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.524 0.472   0.586   
FIRST STAGE — outcome: oral skills in Catalan
native Spanish speaker -2.102*** -1.980*** -1.900*** -2.107***
(0.104) (0.119) (0.126)   (0.103)   
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.114*** 0.125*** 0.166*** 0.109***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.025)   
F-test of excluded instruments 21.78 19.87 36.04 19.08
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.192 0.166   0.224   
2SLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.379*** -1.182*** -0.949*** -1.416***
(0.243) (0.231) (0.185)   (0.256)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.404*** 0.441*** 0.485*** 0.409***
(0.121) (0.122) (0.111)   (0.126)   
adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.496 0.439   0.557   
number of observations 3667 3622 3662   3515   
parents' 
origins
proxy for native language:
no mixed  
language
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials for child's age and
individual's year of birth dummies. Column (1): native language = 1 if the individual's native language is only
Spanish, 0 otherwise. Column (2): parents' language = 1 if both parents are native Spanish speakers, 0 otherwise.
Column (3): parents' origins = 1 if both parents were born outside Catalonia, 0 otherwise. Results in column (4)

































Table A1: complete OLS results, only Spanish speakers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept -7.049*** -12.766** -14.759*** -17.958***
(2.185) (4.709) (3.496) (5.040)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.281*** 0.278*** 0.244*** 0.242***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)   
wave 2013 -0.656*** -1.211*** -1.483*** -1.742***
(0.217) (0.335) (0.279) (0.388)   
age 0.377 0.426 0.407 0.461   
(0.274) (0.300) (0.304) (0.316)   
age
2 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006   
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)   
age
3 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
male 0.020 0.004 -0.004 -0.022   
(0.086) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085)   
age of the first child 0.047 0.042 0.044 0.042   
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)   
age of the first child
2 -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
age of the first child
3 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
father's place of birth: Barcelona
father's place of birth: Girona 0.719 0.088   
(0.433) (0.403)   
father's place of birth: Tarragona -0.412 -0.554   
(0.668) (0.607)   
father's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.202 -0.105   
(0.504) (0.436)   
father's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.291 0.097   
(0.356) (0.353)   
father's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.905* 0.497   
(0.448) (0.426)   
father's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.164 0.043   
(0.534) (0.575)   
father's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.734** 0.679*  
(0.343) (0.353)   
father's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.136 -0.066   
(0.302) (0.301)   
father's place of birth: other Spanish regions 0.077 0.002   
(0.112) (0.117)   
father's place of birth: other places 0.241 0.089   
(0.327) (0.333)   
miss father's place of birth -0.463 -0.426   
(0.525) (0.564)   
mother's place of birth: Barcelona
mother's place of birth: Girona 0.295 -0.265   
(0.479) (0.414)   
mother's place of birth: Tarragona -0.274 -0.340   
(0.279) (0.245)   
mother's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.821 0.014   
(0.538) (0.518)   
mother's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) -0.428 -0.756** 
(0.347) (0.373)   
mother's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.384 0.070   
(0.378) (0.385)   
mother's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.653 0.531   
(0.695) (0.659)   
mother's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.041 0.059   
(0.362) (0.353)   
mother's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia -0.112 -0.179   
(0.259) (0.302)   
mother's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.096 -0.192*  
(0.099) (0.098)   
mother's place of birth: other places 0.466 0.201   
(0.636) (0.689)   
miss mother's place of birth 0.390 0.383   
(0.494) (0.481)   
adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.260 0.293 0.295   
number of observations 1663 1663 1663 1663   
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,






Table A1 (continued): complete OLS results, only Spanish speakers 
 
(2) (3) (4)
(highest) parental education: no education
(highest) parental education: primary 0.143 0.145   
(0.093) (0.086)   
(highest) parental education: secondary 0.150 0.083   
(0.103) (0.106)   
(highest) parental education: tertiary -0.272 -0.350*  
(0.175) (0.198)   
missing parental education 0.313** 0.285   
(0.141) (0.173)   
individual's place of birth: Barcelona
individual's place of birth: Girona 0.689*** 0.720***
(0.223) (0.205)   
individual's place of birth: Tarragona 0.273 0.337   
(0.210) (0.220)   
individual's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.536 0.497   
(0.334) (0.424)   
individual's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.227 0.306   
(0.168) (0.182)   
individual's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.419* 0.350   
(0.237) (0.228)   
individual's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley -0.359 -0.462   
(0.373) (0.424)   
individual's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.203 -0.330   
(0.472) (0.505)   
individual's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.482 0.607   
(0.673) (0.721)   
individual's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.212* -0.156   
(0.113) (0.124)   
individual's place of residence: Barcelona city
individual's place of residence: Barcelona's metropolitan area 0.048 0.064   
(0.150) (0.152)   
individual's place of residence: Girona 0.262 0.292   
(0.263) (0.260)   
individual's place of residence: Tarragona -0.122 -0.087   
(0.178) (0.175)   
individual's place of residence: Southern Catalonia (Terres de 1.022*** 1.066***
(0.236) (0.254)   
individual's place of residence: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.210 0.267   
(0.174) (0.184)   
individual's place of residence: Central Catalonia 0.488** 0.520** 
(0.231) (0.230)   
individual's place of residence: Pyrenees 1.035*** 1.060***
(0.264) (0.278)   
completed education: primary or no education
completed education: secondary 0.173** 0.196** 
(0.072) (0.075)   
completed education: tertiary 0.285** 0.359** 
(0.119) (0.133)   
completed education: other education levels 0.400 0.448   
(0.361) (0.391)   
adjusted R-squared 0.573 0.586 0.588   
number of observations 1663 1663 1663
reference category
reference category
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant





Table A2: complete OLS results, pooled sample of Spanish and Catalan speakers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept -3.246*** -4.100*** -7.284*** -7.489***
(1.062) (1.370) (1.509) (1.688)   
native Spanish speaker -1.647*** -1.413*** -1.468*** -1.334***
(0.047) (0.069) (0.049) (0.068)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.233***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)   
wave 2013 -0.451*** -0.477*** -0.847*** -0.842***
(0.162) (0.167) (0.186) (0.192)   
age 0.218 0.248* 0.262 0.272*  
(0.145) (0.145) (0.157) (0.159)   
age
2 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
age
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
male -0.023 -0.021 -0.016 -0.021   
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)   
age of the first child 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.021   
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)   
age of the first child
2 -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
age of the first child
3 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
father's place of birth: Barcelona
father's place of birth: Girona 0.026 -0.303***
(0.089) (0.097)   
father's place of birth: Tarragona -0.192 -0.249** 
(0.124) (0.121)   
father's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.071 -0.190*  
(0.083) (0.110)   
father's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.154** 0.030   
(0.070) (0.075)   
father's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.146 -0.078   
(0.102) (0.112)   
father's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.015 -0.144   
(0.114) (0.128)   
father's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.210 0.135   
(0.157) (0.179)   
father's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia -0.211 -0.323   
(0.210) (0.200)   
father's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.138* -0.189** 
(0.076) (0.078)   
father's place of birth: other places -0.101 -0.201   
(0.200) (0.188)   
miss father's place of birth -0.148 -0.225   
(0.216) (0.229)   
mother's place of birth: Barcelona
mother's place of birth: Girona 0.186** -0.127   
(0.079) (0.079)   
mother's place of birth: Tarragona 0.202* 0.121   
(0.115) (0.124)   
mother's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.228** -0.119   
(0.085) (0.109)   
mother's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.045 -0.139   
(0.081) (0.107)   
mother's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.126 -0.111   
(0.095) (0.108)   
mother's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.155 -0.016   
(0.128) (0.132)   
mother's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.036 0.009   
(0.149) (0.146)   
mother's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.014 -0.057   
(0.164) (0.186)   
mother's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.043 -0.127** 
(0.057) (0.058)   
mother's place of birth: other places 0.210 0.098   
(0.272) (0.284)   
miss mother's place of birth 0.101 0.008   
(0.245) (0.246)   
adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.572 0.584 0.587   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667 3667   
reference category
reference category
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *









(highest) parental education: no education
(highest) parental education: primary 0.117** 0.108** 
(0.056) (0.050)   
(highest) parental education: secondary 0.134** 0.101*  
(0.051) (0.051)   
(highest) parental education: tertiary -0.078 -0.111   
(0.078) (0.083)   
missing parental education 0.125 0.127   
(0.076) (0.080)   
individual's place of birth: Barcelona
individual's place of birth: Girona 0.257** 0.471***
(0.116) (0.130)   
individual's place of birth: Tarragona 0.265** 0.287** 
(0.102) (0.117)   
individual's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.168* 0.307*  
(0.098) (0.164)   
individual's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.281*** 0.322***
(0.082) (0.101)   
individual's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.153 0.237*  
(0.114) (0.127)   
individual's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley -0.171 -0.114   
(0.111) (0.145)   
individual's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.219 -0.263   
(0.362) (0.384)   
individual's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.399 0.501   
(0.643) (0.683)   
individual's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.264** -0.177   
(0.107) (0.116)   
individual's place of residence: Barcelona city
individual's place of residence: Barcelona's metropolitan area -0.009 0.010   
(0.096) (0.097)   
individual's place of residence: Girona 0.231* 0.279** 
(0.134) (0.137)   
individual's place of residence: Tarragona -0.111 -0.072   
(0.106) (0.105)   
individual's place of residence: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.374*** 0.434***
(0.104) (0.096)   
individual's place of residence: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.035 0.058   
(0.104) (0.110)   
individual's place of residence: Central Catalonia 0.319** 0.339** 
(0.129) (0.133)   
individual's place of residence: Pyrenees 0.529*** 0.542***
(0.116) (0.119)   
completed education: primary or no education
completed education: secondary 0.140*** 0.127***
(0.041) (0.042)   
completed education: tertiary 0.225*** 0.229***
(0.056) (0.059)   
completed education: other education levels 0.285 0.300   
(0.184) (0.190)   
adjusted R-squared 0.572 0.584 0.587   
number of observations 3648 3648 3648   
reference category
reference category
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at





Table A3: complete First-Stage results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept 31.936*** 32.551*** 19.445*** 21.329***
(2.618) (2.658) (2.954) (2.750)   
native Spanish speaker -2.102*** -1.735*** -1.613*** -1.473***
(0.104) (0.117) (0.103) (0.116)   
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.110***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)   
wave 2013 3.115*** 3.185*** 1.916*** 2.083***
(0.413) (0.435) (0.393) (0.398)   
age 0.248 0.224 0.351 0.317   
(0.351) (0.349) (0.343) (0.341)   
age
2 -0.018* -0.018* -0.015 -0.015   
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)   
age
3 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
male -0.266*** -0.262*** -0.181*** -0.200***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)   
age of the first child -0.020 -0.017 0.007 0.007   
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)   
age of the first child
2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
age of the first child
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
father's place of birth: Barcelona
father's place of birth: Girona 0.261* -0.030   
(0.146) (0.170)   
father's place of birth: Tarragona 0.019 -0.132   
(0.175) (0.192)   
father's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.158 -0.227   
(0.141) (0.168)   
father's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.275** -0.016   
(0.119) (0.125)   
father's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.317** -0.110   
(0.124) (0.153)   
father's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.392** -0.051   
(0.175) (0.220)   
father's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.359 -0.465   
(0.423) (0.432)   
father's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.038 -0.162   
(0.390) (0.399)   
father's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.032 -0.102   
(0.106) (0.104)   
father's place of birth: other places -0.065 -0.103   
(0.306) (0.311)   
miss father's place of birth -0.202 -0.294   
(0.505) (0.443)   
mother's place of birth: Barcelona
mother's place of birth: Girona 0.065 -0.330** 
(0.133) (0.163)   
mother's place of birth: Tarragona 0.322** -0.053   
(0.145) (0.199)   
mother's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.239* -0.291*  
(0.140) (0.156)   
mother's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.060 -0.339***
(0.115) (0.115)   
mother's place of birth: Central Catalonia -0.048 -0.440***
(0.124) (0.142)   
mother's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley -0.131 -0.505** 
(0.200) (0.239)   
mother's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.030 0.044   
(0.232) (0.212)   
mother's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia -0.101 -0.236   
(0.289) (0.254)   
mother's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.101 -0.220*  
(0.137) (0.126)   
mother's place of birth: other places -0.175 -0.406   
(0.339) (0.340)   
miss mother's place of birth -0.111 -0.325   
(0.620) (0.618)   
adjusted R-squared 3667 3667 3667 3667   
number of observations 0.222 0.235 0.281 0.284   
reference category
reference category
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%. All regressions include individual's year of birth dummies.
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(highest) parental education: no education
(highest) parental education: primary 0.461*** 0.315***
(0.102) (0.097)   
(highest) parental education: secondary 0.727*** 0.405***
(0.115) (0.112)   
(highest) parental education: tertiary 0.897*** 0.482***
(0.135) (0.135)   
missing parental education 0.432* 0.385   
(0.253) (0.256)   
individual's place of birth: Barcelona
individual's place of birth: Girona 0.298* 0.469** 
(0.150) (0.190)   
individual's place of birth: Tarragona 0.744*** 0.810***
(0.187) (0.212)   
individual's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.349 0.618***
(0.208) (0.215)   
individual's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.351** 0.537***
(0.172) (0.192)   
individual's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.308* 0.572***
(0.170) (0.183)   
individual's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.181 0.504*  
(0.176) (0.278)   
individual's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.887 -0.840   
(0.650) (0.642)   
individual's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia -0.017 0.106   
(0.973) (0.842)   
individual's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.658*** -0.525** 
(0.195) (0.205)   
individual's place of residence: Barcelona city
individual's place of residence: Barcelona's metropolitan area -0.264*** -0.202*  
(0.095) (0.101)   
individual's place of residence: Girona 0.159 0.234   
(0.190) (0.193)   
individual's place of residence: Tarragona -0.377* -0.289   
(0.192) (0.195)   
individual's place of residence: Southern Catalonia (Terres de 0.231 0.391   
(0.202) (0.234)   
individual's place of residence: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.097 0.156   
(0.149) (0.156)   
individual's place of residence: Central Catalonia 0.247 0.335*  
(0.171) (0.169)   
individual's place of residence: Pyrenees 0.304** 0.356** 
(0.144) (0.154)   
completed education: primary or no education
completed education: secondary 0.710*** 0.648***
(0.111) (0.105)   
completed education: tertiary 1.170*** 1.060***
(0.105) (0.103)   
completed education: other education levels 0.766** 0.687*  
(0.345) (0.348)   
adjusted R-squared 0.235 0.281 0.284   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at







Table A4: complete 2SLS results, pooled sample of Spanish and Catalan speakers 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
intercept -3.341 -3.548 -4.023* -4.091*  
(2.701) (2.562) (2.416) (2.466)   
native Spanish speaker -1.379*** -1.244*** -1.270*** -1.179***
(0.243) (0.186) (0.186) (0.175)   
oral skills in Catalan 0.404*** 0.369*** 0.376*** 0.355***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.119) (0.121)   
wave 2013 -0.980** -0.908* -1.200*** -1.174***
(0.469) (0.471) (0.347) (0.393)   
age 0.222 0.253* 0.249* 0.264*  
(0.146) (0.144) (0.149) (0.151)   
age
2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
age
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
male 0.015 0.009 0.010 0.004   
(0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043)   
age of the first child 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.018   
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)   
age of the first child
2 -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
age of the first child
3 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
father's place of birth: Barcelona
father's place of birth: Girona -0.004 -0.300***
(0.096) (0.098)   
father's place of birth: Tarragona -0.194 -0.232** 
(0.123) (0.118)   
father's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.058 -0.160   
(0.082) (0.113)   
father's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.126** 0.035   
(0.064) (0.073)   
father's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.110 -0.066   
(0.109) (0.106)   
father's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley -0.029 -0.138   
(0.113) (0.124)   
father's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.255* 0.197   
(0.155) (0.173)   
father's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia -0.213 -0.302   
(0.205) (0.198)   
father's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.131* -0.175** 
(0.072) (0.074)   
father's place of birth: other places -0.091 -0.185   
(0.195) (0.187)   
miss father's place of birth -0.121 -0.185   
(0.231) (0.243)   
mother's place of birth: Barcelona
mother's place of birth: Girona 0.181** -0.085   
(0.082) (0.085)   
mother's place of birth: Tarragona 0.166 0.128   
(0.117) (0.123)   
mother's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.200** -0.088   
(0.094) (0.104)   
mother's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.035 -0.099   
(0.080) (0.094)   
mother's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.132 -0.057   
(0.093) (0.105)   
mother's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.168 0.044   
(0.123) (0.128)   
mother's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.029 0.000   
(0.150) (0.146)   
mother's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.028 -0.027   
(0.153) (0.167)   
mother's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.030 -0.100*  
(0.055) (0.060)   
mother's place of birth: other places 0.232 0.149   
(0.256) (0.270)   
miss mother's place of birth 0.115 0.050   
(0.239) (0.238)   
adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.555 0.559 0.568   
number of observations 3667 3667 3667 3667
reference category
reference category
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%. All regressions include individual's year of birth dummies.
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(highest) parental education: no education
(highest) parental education: primary 0.117** 0.108** 
(0.056) (0.050)   
(highest) parental education: secondary 0.065 0.069   
(0.077) (0.063)   
(highest) parental education: tertiary 0.056 0.055   
(0.095) (0.067)   
missing parental education -0.172 -0.166*  
(0.124) (0.097)   
individual's place of birth: Barcelona
individual's place of birth: Girona 0.216* 0.414***
(0.117) (0.137)   
individual's place of birth: Tarragona 0.161 0.188   
(0.149) (0.165)   
individual's place of birth: Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.120 0.235   
(0.108) (0.167)   
individual's place of birth: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.232** 0.256** 
(0.095) (0.109)   
individual's place of birth: Central Catalonia 0.109 0.167   
(0.119) (0.128)   
individual's place of birth: Pyrenees and Aran Valley -0.196* -0.173   
(0.109) (0.152)   
individual's place of birth: Balearic Islands and Valencia -0.094 -0.159   
(0.338) (0.356)   
individual's place of birth: Basque Country and Galicia 0.408 0.492   
(0.686) (0.697)   
individual's place of birth: other Spanish regions -0.158 -0.101   
(0.144) (0.141)   
individual's place of residence: Barcelona city
individual's place of residence: Barcelona's metropolitan area 0.026 0.033   
(0.099) (0.098)   
individual's place of residence: Girona 0.208 0.249*  
(0.133) (0.133)   
individual's place of residence: Tarragona -0.060 -0.038   
(0.122) (0.114)   
individual's place of residence: Southern Catalonia (Terres de 0.342*** 0.388***
(0.099) (0.094)   
individual's place of residence: Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.018 0.036   
(0.107) (0.111)   
individual's place of residence: Central Catalonia 0.285** 0.299** 
(0.124) (0.128)   
individual's place of residence: Pyrenees 0.482*** 0.496***
(0.108) (0.109)   
completed education: primary or no education
completed education: secondary 0.042 0.049   
(0.091) (0.087)   
completed education: tertiary 0.066 0.102   
(0.143) (0.135)   
completed education: other education levels 0.181 0.218   
(0.190) (0.190)   
adjusted R-squared 0.555 0.559 0.568   





Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
































OLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.648*** -1.647*** -1.649*** -1.649***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
oral skills in Catalan 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.264***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
adjusted R-squared 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567
BIC 10888.9 10891.9 10889.1 10873.7
FIRST STAGE — outcome: oral skills in Catalan 
native Spanish speaker -2.106*** -2.102*** -2.106*** -2.106***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
adjusted R-squared 0.224 0.222 0.224 0.224
BIC 15155.1 15136.8 15155.1 15155.1
2SLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.356*** -1.379*** -1.390*** -1.341***
(0.236) (0.243) (0.251) (0.244)
oral skills in Catalan 0.416*** 0.404*** 0.399*** 0.425***
(0.118) (0.121) (0.125) (0.121)
adjusted R-squared 0.535 0.540 0.542 0.530
BIC 11159.1 11116.7 11093.6 11168.7
individual's age polynomial order 4 3 2 1
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials
































OLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker -1.650*** -1.647*** -1.643*** -1.644***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
oral skills in Catalan 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.264***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
adjusted R-squared 0.568 0.568 0.567 0.567
BIC 10813.80 10808.20 10807.30 10800.70
FIRST STAGE — outcome: oral skills in Catalan
native Spanish speaker -2.103*** -2.102*** -2.102*** -2.105***
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
exposure × native Spanish speaker 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.117***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.223
BIC 15152.897 15136.764 15128.855 15129.298
2SLS — outcome = language spoken with the first child
native Spanish speaker 5.166*** 5.170*** 5.263*** 5.355***
(0.872) (0.864) (0.851) (0.833)
oral skills in Catalan 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.417*** 0.424***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.119) (0.115)
adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.540 0.534 0.531
BIC 11111.3 11116.7 11153.3 11172.0
child's age polynomial order 4 3 2 1
Note: standard errors clustered by year of birth within parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, cubic polynomials




Table A7: descriptive Statistics by Native Language for the placebo sample of never-






Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
language spoken with first child: only Catalan 0.186 0.472 0.0142 0.1182 0.4496 0.4977
language spoken with first child: more Catalan than Spanish 0.048 0.184 0.0087 0.0930 0.1074 0.3098
language spoken with first child: equal Catalan and Spanish 0.072 0.259 0.0272 0.1628 0.1407 0.3479
language spoken with first child: more Spanish than Catalan 0.035 0.213 0.0234 0.1513 0.0525 0.2230
language spoken with first child: only Spanish 0.659 0.384 0.9265 0.2611 0.2498 0.4331
age of the first child 24.06 10.22 24.919 10.163 22.754 10.168
oral skills in Catalan 8.697 2.208 9.5316 0.9741 7.4205 2.8616
oral skills in Spanish 9.519 1.019 9.3956 1.1465 9.7075 0.7455
native Spanish speaker 0.395 0.489 0.0000 1.0000
Catalan (or Catalan and Spanish) as self-identification language 0.746 0.435 0.9836 0.1271 0.3809 0.4858
partner Catalan (or Catalan and Spanish) native speaker 0.635 0.481 0.8083 0.3938 0.3700 0.4830
both parents Spanish speakers 0.347 0.476 0.0281 0.1652 0.8361 0.3703
both parents born outside Catalonia 0.327 0.469 0.0449 0.2071 0.7560 0.4296
years of compulsory language exposure 0.000 0.0000 0.0000
wave 2013 0.519 0.500 0.5158 0.4999 0.5237 0.4996
age 52.33 7.67 53.320 7.719 50.829 7.351
male 0.463 0.499 0.4635 0.4988 0.4621 0.4988
number of observations
(pooled) sample of never 
treated individuals                  
(1945-1969)
native Catalan 
speakers, never treated 
sample  (1945-1969)
native Spanish 
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